In this issue of Neuron, Rozeske et al. (2018) use an ingenuous behavioral paradigm to change pertinent sensory stimuli defining a given context to interrogate how the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and periaqueductal gray (PAG) interact during contextual fear discrimination.
To know an object is to lead to it through a context which the world provides.-William James (The
Meaning of Truth)
Memory generalization-which can be thought of as the retrieval of information in circumstances that differ from those prevailing during initial learning-is enormously useful for transferring information learned in one time and place to new situations. However, overgeneralization can become a problem in certain psychopathologies. In sufferers of anxiety disorders and trauma-and stressor-related disorders (aka posttraumatic stress disorder), for instance, overgeneralizing a traumatic encounter leads to the debilitating sense that danger could lurk around every corner. Put another way, for sufferers of these disorders, contextual information fails to properly gate the retrieval of threat-related cues, resulting in an anxiety response that is inappropriate to the situation. With this in mind, it does not take a big leap of logic to appreciate the value in understanding the neural processes that underlie generalization of ''fear'' or ''threat'' memories. Through an understanding of memory generalization, we gain insight into the pathophysiology of anxiety and traumarelated disorders while learning something important about how prior experiences are used to attune behaviors to the situation at hand. Neuroscience has begun to make inroads into identifying the key brain systems underlying fear memory generalization. Much of the work has made use of behavioral procedures based around Pavlovian fear conditioning in rodents, and it is easy to see why-these paradigms offer a relatively simple and quick, yet reliable and robust, way to probe memory by pairing a context with an aversive stimulus (usually a footshock) and subsequently measuring the conditioned response (often freezing) to that context. ''Context'' in a standard fear conditioning experiment is typically a pared down test chamber consisting of a grid floor and plain walls and maybe spiked with an unfamiliar odor. Clearly, such contexts are not the rich, complex environments in which a person would encounter a traumatic event, but they nevertheless afford a well-controlled laboratory approximation.
So what we do currently know of the neural systems supporting contextual fear and, more specifically, the substrates for context fear discrimination and generalization? In this issue of Neuron, Rozeske and colleagues offer significant new insight into some of the key neural circuits involved (Rozeske et al., 2018) . Building on previous work implicating the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and periaqueductal gray (PAG) in the mediation of various forms of fear memory, the current article employs an impressive array of techniques in mice to interrogate how these brain regions interact during contextual fear discrimination.
Previous studies showing that lesioning, inactivating, or interfering with synaptic transmission in the dmPFC prevented effective cue-guided context discrimination had suggested that the dmPFC signals to direct attention to threat-predictive cues in ambiguous environments (Antoniadis and McDonald, 2006; Sharpe and Killcross, 2015; Xu and S€ udhof, 2013) .
To provide more direct evidence of dmPFC neuronal activity during discrimination, Rozeske et al. (2018) undertook in vivo single-unit recordings to reveal a subpopulation of dmPFC principal cells that changed firing in lockstep with whether the current context resembled or differed from the conditioning context. Indeed, they found that activity of these cells preceded changes in freezing during transitions between low and high feargenerating contexts. Their analysis was enabled by an ingenuous behavioral paradigm that allowed for changes in the pertinent sensory stimuli defining each context without the need to move the mouse between apparatuses. Rozeske et al. (2018) next turned to the question of the ''downstream'' brain regions communicating with the dmPFC to allow for contextual discrimination. Among the list of potential candidates, which would include the amygdala, hippocampus, and nucleus reuniens among others (Bukalo et al., 2015; Xu and S€ udhof, 2013) , they chose to focus on the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala (BLA) and the lateral and ventrolateral subdivisions of the PAG (l/vPAG). The importance of bidirectional interactions between the dmPFC and BLA in fear is well established and, there are also good grounds for hypothesizing a role for the PAG in fear discrimination. Artificially stimulating the PAG produces profound increases in escape behavior and other defensive responses, and there is evidence for a role of the l/vPAG in conditioned fear from a variety of sources (e.g., Arico et al., 2017; Johansen et al., 2010; Tovote et al., 2016) .
To record from those populations of dmPFC neurons projecting to either the BLA or the l/vPAG, Rozeske et al. (2018) used a painstaking combination of electrical and optogenetic approaches to tag dmPFC neurons based on their output target. The payoff from this approach is that it allowed Rozeske et al. (2018) to attribute successful contextual discrimination to increases specifically in those dmPFC neurons projecting to the l/vPAG (and not the BLA). Their finding that there is at least one set of outputs in the dmPFC that are associated with low fear states (as manifest during context discrimination) is in and of itself notable given the prevailing view that this region is typically excitatory, rather than inhibitory, to fear (Tovote et al., 2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2014) . Finally, to bolster their compelling, but ultimately correlative, electrophysiological data with manipulations of a more causal nature, Rozeske et al. (2018) selectively photostimulated or photosilenced the dmPFC/l/ vPAG pathway to decrease fear to a conditioned context or to increase fear to an unconditioned context (i.e., produce generalization), respectively. Interestingly, optogenetically manipulating the same cells did not alter conditioned fear responses to a discrete cue, providing at least initial evidence that the dmPFC/l/ vPAG circuit might have a privileged role separate from other circuits (e.g., dmPFC/BLA supporting discrimination of discrete threat cues) in contextual fear discrimination.
Taken as a whole, this article offers an excellent example of how the state-ofthe-art technologies now available to neuroscientists can be brought to bear to answer an outstanding question with implications for both basic research and the clinic. Nonetheless, many questions remain to be addressed by future work in this area. Though the current study clearly demonstrates that the recruitment of the dmPFC/l/vPAG pathway is both necessary and sufficient for discriminating between threatening and safe contexts, it remains unclear precisely which cell types dmPFC neurons impinge upon in the l/vPAG to affect the latter's function. The origin of contextual information to the dmPFC is another open question. The hippocampus is one obvious source, given the well-established contribution of hippocampal function to contextual fear discrimination and other forms of pattern separation (Frankland et al., 1998; McHugh et al., 2007) .
Beyond these and other questions directed at a more fine-grained circuit mapping, these new findings open the way to some interesting future work around models of abnormal fear. Emerging evidence from studies in rodents and humans indicates that the PFC is vulnerable to a range of insults that are known risk factors for anxiety disorders, such as stress and drugs of abuse, with detrimental consequences for many of the higher-order cognitive processes dependent upon this region. Rozeske et al. (2018) 's article now provides a platform from which to begin studying how the normal functions of the dmPFC/l/vPAG pathway and interacting neural circuits become compromised in anxiety disorders, leading to fear overgeneralization and the sense that the threat of harm is ever present.
